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IN

A LETTER TO Swiss pastor Oskar Pfister in 1918, Sigmund Freud wrote,
"Why did none of the devout create psychoanalysis? Why did it have to wait for
a completely godless Jew?" Casually denying both Freud's Judaism and his
"godlessness," Pfister replied, "A better Christian there never was!"
Like the nineteenth-century "quest for the historical Jesus," the recent quest
for the historical Freud has proven remarkable in the variety and diversity of its
formulations. The self-proclaimed "godless Jew" becomes, in Peter Gay's recent volume of that title, more godless than Jewish. Paul Vitz, following
Pfister's lead in claiming Freud for Christianity, makes him neither godless nor
Jewish. Joachim Scharfenberg finds a theological Freud seeking faith. Julia
Kristeva finds a post-atheistic Freud. Eli Sagan finds a troubled moralist.
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The recent scholarship on Freud is guilty of the same kind of ideological projection as that uncovered by Albert Schweitzer in his 1906 expos~ of the assumptions underlying the "historical Jesus" scholarship: the search for the
religious Freud evinces a search for an atheist, Christian, or Jew who mirrors
the personal and intellectual assumptions of the seeker. Ironically, of the three
issues emerging as central concerns in recent literature on Freud-Jewishness,
ethics, and gender-Jewishness and ethics were also the focus of heated debate
among nineteenth-century Biblical scholars.
Dennis Klein (1985) has functioned as the Schweitzer of Freud scholarship
in revealing the ideologies beneath the debate over Freud's Jewishness. Many
biographers, even those with admirable intentions, have either denied or underestimated the psychoanalytic movement's Jewish context and content. Desiring
to emphasize the universal truths discovered by Freud, Ernest Jones, Freud's
"official" biographer and the first non-Jew in Freud's inner circle, down played
Freud's Jewish identity. Alternately, a tradition of overestimation of Freud's
Jewish identity has attempted either to dismiss psychoanalysis as merely a Jewish crypto-science or to foster Jewish interests by demonstrating the creative
impact of Jews on modem life. Each of these positions is prone to ideological
excess. Each is ahistorical, ignoring both the changing political and religious
context of Freud's life and the shifting meaning of Judaism for him (Klein,
1985, xii).
Freud was, throughout his life, a "godless Jew," but both his godlessness and
his Jewishness took on different meanings in different circumstances. These
changes are particularly evident during the fonnative decades of his youth and
the period of his discovery of psychoanalysis. A source of shame and suffering
prior to 1880, his Jewishness meant a proudly held sectarian and ethnic identity
in the late 1880s and an ethical universalism and a finn foundation of psychoanalysis in the 1890s. Jewishness never, however, meant belief in God. Freud's
godlessness is a less variable concept, but it, too, is more nuanced than most biographers make it.
The question of Freud's personal religious identity must be seen against the
background of Austrian politics. Born in 1856, Freud was an Eastern European
Jew whose family moved to Vienna in 1859 in a climate of political liberalism
and toleration. The liberalism of the 1860s and 70s resulted in an unprecedented integration of Jews into Austrian culture. As a youth, Freud embraced
Austrian assimilationism and Gennan nationalism, even going so far as to
change his name from the Jewish Sigismund to the more Gennanic Sigmund.
Freud's childhood home was not atypical among Jewish families in liberal
Austria. Assimilated to the cosmopolitan culture of Vienna, the family spoke
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German and ignored such observances as the Sabbath. As a youth, Freud read
the Old Testament avidly, but he saw the Bible as a hwnanitarian and ethical
docmnent, not as a sacred text. His assimilated Judaism was essentially nonreligious. As a university student influenced by the rationalism and determinism
of Helmholtz, Darwin, and Briicke, he defined himself as an atheistic, scientific
materialist.
However, letters between Freud and his friend Silberstein reveal the complexity of Freud's "godlessness" at this time. In the 1870s Freud took five
courses at the University of Vienna from the Catholic philosopher Franz
Brentano, whose sophisticated argmnents for the existence of God influenced
him deeply. A letter to Silberstein in 1875 says, "At the moment I am no longer
a materialist but not yet a theist .... In the course of several semesters I mean to
become thoroughly acquainted with (Brentano's) philosophy and until then to
reserve judgment on it as well as to hold off a decision between theism and materialism" (McGrath, 1986, 118). Freud's 1927 work, The Future ofan Illusion,
represents a return to his debates with Brentano.
In the 1880s the decades of Austrian liberalism came to an end in a massive
political shift marked by the end of assimilationism and a sharp rise in antiSemitism. These were years of profound disillusionment and moral outrage for
Freud,leading to a defensive, defiant Jewishness, which, by the mid 1880s, bad
matured to a Jewish pride that was more than defensive.
But Freud remained firmly opposed to religious belief and ritual. His opposition to ritual even led him to consider conversion to Protestantism in order to
have a civil wedding and thereby avoid an orthodox Jewish ceremony. If the
1870s had represented a period of godless, assimilated Jewishness for Freud, by
the end of the 1880s Freud was a godless Jew in another sense: his still atheistic
Jewishness was an expression of ethnic pride.
Struggling to establish his professional career amidst the continuing antiSemitism of the 1890s led to further developments in Freud's Jewish identity.
He joined B 'nai B 'rith in 1897. In both ideology and membership this group
prefigured the analytic circle Freud founded in 1902. Common to both was a
sense of a universalist, ethical mission based on Jewish identity. Both groups
defined their Jewishness as allegiance to the ideals of progress, humanitarianism, and ethical universalism. With a degree of missionary fervor Freud expressed the view that Jewish consciousness imparted to psychoanalysis "a
dynamism aimed at benefiting all mankind" (Klein, 1985, 148).
By 1908, however, Freud desired to broaden the appeal oflhe psychoanalytic
movement. He wrote of the danger of the movement's becoming a "Jewish National Affair," and he argued in 1910 that "it is absolutely essential that I should
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form ties in the world of general science" (Klein, 94). But he never completely
abandoned his sense of psychoanalysis as a "Jewish science" or his sense of
identity with Moses. In the preface to the Hebrew translation of Totem and
Taboo, he said, for example, "If the question were put to (me): 'Since you have
abandoned all these common characteristics of your countrymen, what is there
left to you that is Jewish?' I would reply: 'A very great deal, and probably its
very essence'" (in McGrath, 1988, 29).
Letters and accounts of private conversations reveal a continuing fascination
with the ideas of theism, God, and the occult. Freud's published writings are
rife with the playful use of religious language and metaphor: he speaks, for example of "our God Logos" and of the "Heavenly Powers." Clearly, his godlessness was never monolithic. Publicly, however, Freud always remained a
godless Jew: atheistic i~ terms of belief and Jewish in terms of ethnic identity
and ethical universalism.
In A Godless Jew: Freud, Atheism, and the Making of Psychoanalysis Peter
Gay fails to differentiate the ethnic, ethical, and theistic aspects of Judaism. Locating Freud entirely in the tradition of the secular Enlightenment thinkers, he
affirms Freud's atheism but denies his Jewishness. In Sigmund Freud's Christian Unconscious Paul Vitz denies both Freud's atheism and his Jewishness.
There is little that can be said in favor of Vitz's book. Vitz has gathered a
massive collection of gossip, speculations, and misinterpretations. His thesis is
that Freud had a lifelong attraction to Christianity and deeply desired to be baptized. He develops this thesis by seeking out references to God, the Bible,
Rome, and Christian authors or artists in Freud's letters and published works.
Any such reference functions as proof of Freud's putative desire for baptism.
Alternately, references to the Devil, Hell, and the Anti-Christ reveal Freud's
deep ambivalence about Christianity, which in turn "proves" his (repressed) attraction toil.
V itz offers little acknowledgment of the historical context which made assimilation attractive in the 1870s and impossible later; nor is there any acknowledgment of the anti-Semitism Freud faced throughout his life. Freud's
1870s assimilationism is interpreted as a desire to convert to Christianity (86)
rather·than a response to Austrian liberalism. His thought of converting to Protestantism in order to have a civil rather than religious wedding ceremony is interpreted not as anti-ritualistic but as pro-Christian (94). Freud's 1897 dream
series about laying siege to Rome is interpreted by Vitz as a literal desire for
Catholic conversion (86). Freud himself saw these dreams as an angry response
to the increased Catholic and Austrian anti-Semitism of the 1890s.
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Vitz seeks the source of Freud's personal desire for baptism and his intellectual hostility to religious belief in childhood experiences-particularly in his
love for the Catholic nanny who had cared for him during his first two and a
half or three years and in the trauma of her sudden departure. In a scenario
meant to explain the nanny's departure, Vitz suggests that Freud's mother,
Amalie, had an affair with Freud's half-brother Philip. The nanny, according to
Vitz, discovered the lovers and was fired to protect their secret.
The nanny/mother/lover combination is ubiquitous in Vitz. It is used to explain not only Freud's atheism but also most of the components of his life and
theory. Freud's fascination with sexuality and incest is explained as a continuation of childhood curiosity about the Amalie-Philip relationship. Freud's rejection of the "divine father, is explained as an inevitable result of his loss of
respect for the personal father betrayed by Amalie and Philip (36). Freud's critique of religion in The Future of an Illusion is seen as "an expression of his attempt to cope with lost happiness ... [H]e was consciously turning with
bitterness and anger ... on his nanny and on the ideas so deeply associated with
her: salvation Christianity, and the Catholic church" (216). Freud's rejection of
Judaism is caused by the nanny's putative anti-Semitism (103); his "love" of
Christianity and his fascination with Rome by her Catholicism; his dislike of
music by the church bells he "might" have heard while in Catholic churches
with her (117); his choice of the name "Anna" for his daughter by its rhyming
with "nana, (29). The nanny is even brought out to explain the absence of the
Virgin Mary in Freud's writings: the nanny was too old to provide a good psychological symbol for the Virgin Mary ( 191 ).
Vitz discovers "evidence" for these claims through a henneneutics of transparency: anything Freud wrote is self-revelation. All the metapsychological
writings are disguised autobiography, while the case histories represent materials Freud chose to discuss because they resembled his own life (138). Freud's
letters and dreams are plundered as well. But even without such "evidence"
Vitz is unperturbed. He does not hesitate to offer speculations about what Freud
"probably" experienced or what "might" have happened. Vitz's argument is a
travesty of scholarly research and methodology, and a paradigmatic example of
the dangers of psychobiographies that ignore historical and political contexts.
In a classic ad hominem argument Vitz tries to show that Freud's atheism is a
pathological and neurotic response to childhood trauma, that Freud's critique of
religion in general is psychologically determined and erroneous, and that
Freud's entire theory can be explained away as mere symptom. Vitz remains
unaware of the irony that his own methodology of psychoanalyzing the psychoanalyst remains dependent upon the tools he attempts to prove erroneous.
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Freud's complex identity as a godless Jew is not addressed by Vitz's text.
Gennan theologian Joachim Scharfenberg and French psychoanalyst Julia
Kristeva, however, offer more sophisticated analyses of Freud's identity. Both
contribute to a nuanced understanding of his "godlessness." Scharfenberg's primary concern is the psychoanalytic critique of religion rather than the personal
faith of Freud the man. But he, too, seeks to find faith embedded in the atheism
of psychoanalytic theory. Through a careful examination of Freud's writings on
delusion he discovers within Freud an acknowledgment that although religion
may be delusory, it is nevertheless meaningful. By calling religion a delusion,
Freud implies a homology with other delusory "symptoms": religion functions
as a "meaningful reaction of the psyche in an attempt to heal itself' (135). Not
content with finding religion for Freud meaningful but wrong, Scharfenberg
finds in The Future of an Illusion an acknowledgment that religion actually
contains a certain historical truth: the historical memory of the primal horde.
Thus, Scharfenberg argues convincingly, Freud leaves open the possibility for
the coexistence of faith and the reality principle. Finally, Scharfenberg goes beyond Freud's texts to reshape Freud's atheism into faith. He suggests that in his
lifelong occupation with religious phenomena Freud was searching for "a mature fom1 of faith that would correspond to the state of psychic maturity for
which he strived with his patients .. .. a faith that did not distort reality through
delusion and which ... did not remain bound to an ahistorical metaphysics of
the soul" (145).
Kristeva's discussion of psychoanalysis and faith is the most valuable of
these books under review. Her comments are not biographical but focus on psychoanalysis as therapy. By implication, however, she suggests that Freud renounced both faith and atheism.
In The Future of an Illusion Freud had defined illusion not as an idea which
is necessarily wrong but as an idea whose source is an unconscious wish. Religion is illusory: neither provable nor disprovable, it originates in wishes for
consolation, protection, or eternal life. Although Freud recommends a strenuous, reality-oriented life without the consolation of illusions, Kristeva aims to
restore illusion to its full therapeutic and epistemological value. She shows that
analysis leads to a simultaneous renunciation of illusion through a skepticism
regarding all received knowledge and a resumption of transitory ludic illusions:
"the function of psychoanalysis is to reawaken the imagination and to pennit illusions to exist." But, she asks, "Does this mean restoring value to religion as
well? Not altogether" (1987, 18). Her renunciation of both faith and atheism allows Freud his godlessness without locking him into a rigid atheism: "Repres-
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sion can be atheist, atheism is repressive, whereas the experience of psychoanalysis can lead to renunciation of faith with clear understanding" (26).
The faith of Freud has emerged as a compelling issue in this recent literature.
Vitz projects his own Christian fundamentalism onto Freud. The theologian
Scharfenberg addresses the question carefully but cannot resist making Freud
into a seeker of faith. Only the psychoanalyst Kristeva honors Freud's godlessness.
Another compelling issue in the recent proliferation of interpretations of
Freud is that of gender and morality. Eli Sagan in Freud, Women, atul Morality
criticizes psychoanalytic theory of morality by uncovering logical inconsistencies in Freud's analysis of the superego. These inconsistencies, he suggests, are
caused by Freud's deep ambivalence toward women and are a direct result of
pre-Oedipal traumata: Freud suffered, and subsequently repressed, severe
threats of castration from a pre-Oedipal maternal figure. Avoiding any speculation about the nanny. he assumes Freud's mother was the culprit
Sagan's discussion of the psychoanalytic theory of the superego is well-conceived and carefully argued. He points out that Freud has three kinds of texts on
morality: cultural texts like Totem and Taboo which offer a hypothetical theory
of the origins of the moral impulse in civilization; metapsychological texts like
The Ego and the ld which explain the role of the Oedipus Complex in the development of the superego; and case histories like "Little Hans" which graphically
demonstrate the workings of the Oedipus Complex. Sagan demonstrates the
contradictions among these texts. While the meta psychological texts argue that
the renunciation of Oedipal fantasies leads to the resolution of the Oedipus
Complex and the development of the superego, the case history shows Little
Hans working through his Oedipal Complex by means of dreanlS which allow
him to imagine the fulfillment of Oedipal fantasies; and the reconstruction of
the origins of culture and morality in the primal horde has the sons successfully
fulfilling their pa"icidalfantasies.
Sagan sees the metapsychological texts as erroneous, arguing that fantasized
fulfillment of wishes, rather than renunciation of wishes, allows for moral development: "consummation, not renunciation, is the way to psychic health"
(85). Why, he asks, did Freud reject in his theoretical works a truth that had
been clearly perceived in the case history and in the myth of cultural origins?
The inconsistencies, Sagan suggests, are a result of repression and denial of
pre-Oedipal trauma, a repression which is responsible for his erroneous view of
morality, his exclusion of women from renunciatory morality, and his misogynist theory of female sexuality. "Freud revenged himself on all women-mothers
by constructing a theory tltat established their genital and moral equipment as
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vastly inferior. The theory of morality was a casualty of that unnecessary ven~
geance" (84).
Although Freud's relationship with his father has been carefully examined
by many scholars, the relationship with his mother remains largely unexplored.
Freud himself never subjected to analysis his relationship with the strong and
energetic Amalie. TI1e formative role of Freud's mother in the development of
the psychoanalytic theory of gender, female sexuality, and morality is an important question which deserves further investigation. But Sagan's analysis of
this material remains incomplete.
Sagan also aspires to a constructive project: he desires to develop a nonsexist
psychoanalytic theory of moral development. He locates the origins of conscience in the pre-Oedipal period, thereby removing the misogyny from Freud's
theory and "correcting" the errors in psychoanalysis. Maternal love and nurture, he suggests, give rise to identification and idealization: these are the
sources of a relational and egalitarian moral capacity.
Several problems emerge here. First, Sagan fails to locate his critique in the
context of the ongoing discourse regarding feminism, psychoanalysis, morality,
and the pre-Oedipal mother. Neither Nancy Chodorow's analysis of gender development and the pre-Oedipal period nor Carol Gilligan's relational theory of
gender and morality appears in the bibliography. Nor is the work of Juliet
Mitchell m~ntioned. Mitchell's important text Psychoanalysis and Feminism
(1974) argues that Freud accurately depicted gender and morality in patriarchal
cultures. Sagan's failure to address these materials weakens his argument
Second, current thinkers in the areas of feminism and psychoanalysis have
furthered Mitchell's analysis by showing the difficulty of separating Freud's
misogyny from his theory. Judith Van Herik (1982) has demonstrated that
Freud's misogyny is structurally embedded in the theory itself: femininity and
masculinity function as primary structural foundations of psychoanalysis,
working as logical equivalents to wish fulfillment and renunciation, illusion
and reason. If Van Herik is right, misogyny cannot be so easily lifted from psychoanalysis: morality is renunciatory and masculine in psychoanalytic theory;
it cannot be restructured as fulfilling and feminine.
Third, Sagan misconceives the pre-Oedipal mother-child relation. While he
implies that the pre-Oedipal period constitutes a purely feminine realm prior to
language and culture, giving rise to true morality. Kristeva's analysis of faith,
and morality in In The Beginning was Love shows the error of Sagan's constnJction. Kristeva has written other texts which address more specifically the
question of cultural misogyny. the pre-Oedipal relationship, and feminist theory (1982. 1986. 1987)./n the Beginning was Love has a different focus: it
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seeks homologies between the experience of religious faith and the experience
of the psychoanalytic transference relationship. But Kristeva's well-known
analysis of gender and culture is present, if not explicit, throughout her text
Kristeva opposes Sagan's view in an oblique but fundamental way, avoiding
the temptation to seek the origins of faith, morality, and love in a simplistic
analysis of pre-Oedipal mothering. She speaks of the origins of faith in the experience of divine lov~. describing faith as a primary identification with a loving and protective agency. This protective agency however, is not only
maternal but, through language and culture, paternal and symbolic as well.
Similarly, the transference relationship is not a recreation of maternal nurture
but a paternal (linguistic, symbolic) relationship of dialogue and exchange
based on love: "Overcoming the notion of irremediable separation, Western
man ... reestablishes a continuity or fusion with an Other that is no longer substantial and maternal but symbolic and paternaf' (24, emphasis mine).
Kristeva reminds us that St. Augustine compared Christian faith in God with
the infant's relation to its mother's breast. Her interpretation of this text reveals
her understanding of the transformation of maternal imagery into the paternal
symbolic structures of Christianity: "What we have here is fusion with a breast
that is, to be sure, succoring, nourishing,loving, protective, but transposed from
mother's body to an invisible agency located in another world" (24). The implications of Kristeva's argument are powerful. First, contra Sagan, there is no
purely feminine, pre-Oedipal basis of morality: morality is inevitably shaped,
through language, by patriarchal discourse. Second, Freud's androcentrism is
not defensive, as Sagan would have it, but rather an accurate perception of the
embeddedness of the paternal in culture.
Kristeva speaks from a feminist position dramatically different from
Sagan's. Their differences epitomize current debates between French and
American feminists. With the finest of intentions, American feminists like
Sagan criticize sexism and promote egalitarian visions of human interaction.
Kristeva and other French feminists, however, maintain that the American position ignores the subtlety of the cultural construction of gender. While Kristeva
is a very conscious participant in this discourse, Sagan is unaware not only of
the French feminist perspective but also of the views of the American feminists
who share his vision.
Kristeva 's evocative comments on ethics also avoid the reductionism of
Sagan's approach. Sagan argues not only that true conscience originates in the
pre-Oedipal relationship but also that Freud's theory of superego morality is essentially immoral. While Freud has often been attacked for immorality, the
standard critique accuses him of an antinomian undermining of social and sex-
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ual norms. Sagan's critique is based on the opposite set of asswnptions: social
and sexual norms are often inunoral, and Freud's notion of the social construction of the superego offers no vantage point from which to criticize culturally
sanctioned injustice. Kristeva, by contrast, finds in Freud a truly ethical position. Morality in psychoanalytic theory is based on a free engagement with the
Other: "only the meaning that my desire may have for another, and hence for
me, can control its expansion, hence serve as the unique if tenuous basis of a
morality" (63). This moral engagement with the Other comes about through
analysis itself: "The real end of analysis occurs when a certain playfulness of
spirit returns . . . . I am indeed alone, like no other person. Knowing this, I can
also play for real, for keeps, at fonning bonds, creating communities, helping
others, loving, losing" (51). In Kristeva' s last words in this text, psychoanalysis
becomes the privileged medium of meaning and morality: "psychoanalysis ...
is the modest if tenacious antidote to nihilism . . . [but, Kristeva asks] for bow
long" (63). Unlike Sagan's oppositional critique of Freud, Kristeva offers a
subtle and lyrical homage to Freud, finding an affirmation of relational morality
both in Freud's texts and in the analytic situation.
Scharfenberg, in effect, joins Kristeva in defending Freud against Sagan's
accusation. Freud does challenge traditional morality, Scharfenberg suggests,
by demanding "that ethical decision be based on insight" rather than obedience
to authority (130). The resolution to the debates over Freud's ethics lies in the
psychoanalytic discussion of the freedom that comes about through the transference relationship: dialogue in analysis becomes "the source of ethical decision, and ethics itself would be stripped of its compelling, enslaving, taboo
character and be freed instead to become a kind of traffic code for interaction
with other people" (132). This ethical freedom transcends the ahistorical "repetition compulsion," moving toward the possibility of health, change, and love.
The analyses of Kristeva and Scharfenberg serve to exonerate Freud from
Sagan's insistence that the superego is immoral. Sagan himself admits toward
the end of his book (although only in a footnote) that Freud's late writings on
Eros "transform the superego into a truly moral instrument" (215).
Sagan's demonstration of inconsistencies in Freud's analysis of Oedipal resolution and superego function remains an important contribution to the psychoanalytic literature. Provocative, but incompletely developed, are his
suggestions regarding Freud's mother and her influence on his theories. Most
problematic are his attack on psychoanalysis as inunoral and his naive construction of a pre-Oedipal source of morality.
Scharfenberg and Kristeva address two topics which are not concerns of either Sagan or Vitz: language and love. Their conunents must be placed in the
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context of their books. Written two decades ago in 1%8, Scharfenberg's book
was only recently translated from the German. Although somewhat dated, it
nevertheless offers a significant analysis of the psychoanalytic critique of religion. Urging theologians to take Freud seriously, Scharfenberg constructs three
major argmnents. First, Freud's critique leads not to a dissolution of faith but to
a purification of inauthentic elements from faith. Second, Freud's writings on
therapy and culture contain an implicit vision of mature faith. Third, Freud's
analysis of illness and healing offers a theory of language with important implications for theology.
An informative chapter on theological reactions to Freud surveys the European literature. Scharfenberg enumerates both theologians who reacted with
hostility to Freud's work and theologians like Paul Tillich and Oskar PCister,
who embraced psychoanalysis. But his goal is to move beyond both the resistance to Freud and the "uncritical idealization or adaptation of Freud by theologians" toward a "critical interaction" (24) where the practice of psychoanalytic
therapy can shape a fresh understanding of religion and theology.
Scharfenberg is most original in his discussion of Freud's theory of language. He juxtaposes the linguistic nature of diagnosis and cure in Freud with
the linguistic nature of hermeneutics and proclamation in theology. For Freud,
language is the source of illness: the hysterical symptom is a literalization of a
body-based linguistic "organ language." It is also the basis of healing: psychoanalysis is "the talking cure." Language and interpretation are interpersonal:
meaning emerges through transference and countertransference. Language in
therapy leads to a freedom "beyond the ahistorical entrapment in the compulsion to repeat, into a history-making and liberating capacity to love." Thus language in analysis leads to the freedom to love. This psychoanalytic notion of
language, Scharfenberg argues, is deeply relevant to the theological location of
proclamation and revelation in language: "NoU1ing is real until it can be made
present by putting it into language and thus reality can be regarded as only a
category of language .... In the realm of theology. hermeneutics is the grammar
of faith" (1 03 ). Scharfenberg thus provocatively explores territories of profound value for theology.
This otherwise fine book is flawed by 0. C. Dean Jr.'s poor translation and
irresponsible editorial policy. In order to avoid "discouraging the prospective
reader" (viii), Dean, a Methodist minister in Georgia, has shortened the text and
bibliography and omitted most of the German footnotes. Nevertheless, U1e book
remains a useful text on the theological response to Freud's critique of religion,
offering an articulate portrayal of Christian faith deepened by the psychoanalytic critique.
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Julia Kristeva's In the Beginning was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith grew
out of a series of lectures delivered to students at a Catholic school inVersailles. In this slender volume Kristeva develops an extension of her earlier
work Tales of Love. A wide-ranging examination of love as the root of all narratives, Tales included an examination of the amorous dialogue which makes up
transference and countertransference in analysis. In the Beginning furthers this
project, turning specifically to the question of love as the common ground of
psychoanalytic therapy and religious faith.
Jacques Lacan is mentioned only twice, but his presence is ubiquitous.
Kristeva is constantly in dialogue with him over the question of the human subject, the nature of otl1emess, and tile question of language and affect. Her location of affect (the "semiotic") at the center of the unconscious represents a
subtle departure from La can 's insistence on the centrality of language (the
"symbolic'') in the unconscious.
The connections Kristeva weaves among language, affect, and body become
the context for a discussion of the process of interaction in analytic dialogue,
the transfonnations made possible through successful analysis, and the psychological aptness of the central symbols of Christianity. She notes that the "mobilization of two people's minds and bodies by the sole agency of the words that
pass between them sheds light on Freud's famous remark ... that the foundation of the cure is 'Our God Logos'." It also recalls the words of the gospels, 'In
the beginning was the Word' and 'God is love'."
In a delightful analysis of the central symbols of Christianity's Credo, she
suggests that Christianity embodies the basic fantasies encountered every day
in the psychic lives of patients: "The alnlighty father? Patients miss one, want
one, or suffer from one.... More than any other religion, Christianity has unraveled the symbolic and physical importance of the patemal function in human
life .... Consubstantiality with the father and symbolic identification with his
name? Patients aspire to nothing else .... A virgin mother? We want our mothers to be virgins so that we can love them better or allow ourselves to be loved
by them without fear of rival. ... The scandal of the cross .... Christianity supplies images for even the fissures in our secret and fundamental logic. How can
we not believe?" (40-42). She likens Christianity to psychoanalysis. With the
Credo Christians "have already begun the analytic process. Is it not true that
analysis begins with something comparable to faith, namely transferential
love?" (52).
Yet Kristeva conunends neither faith nor atheism. Analysis favors neither a
stoic world comprised of "lonely men and women without ties to one another
and without religion" nor a world of illusory fai~. Analysis tenninates beyond
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the need for an illusory faith and beyond the repression of faith in atheism. It
terminates with a desire to question all received truths, a capacity for play, and
a joyous engagement with others.
While the transferentiallanguage of psychoanalysis is the mediwn of ethics,
meaning, and freedom for both Kristeva and Scharfenberg, love functions differently for the two authors. Love is the telos of Scharfenberg's analysis, but for
Kristeva love is the beginning, the context which makes possible both therapeutic analysis and religious faith. Kristeva 's telos is the post-analytic position,
where "gravity becomes frivolity and retains its memory of suffering and continues its search for truth in the joy of perpetually making a new beginning"
(52). Kristeva 's post-analytic "new beginning," however, evokes the pre-analytic beginning: in the beginning was love, and in the beginning was the word.
Love and language, for Kristeva, are both the beginning and the end of analysis.
Among the first recipients of the Goethe Prize for literature were Albert
Schweitzer in 1928 and Sigmund Freud in 1930. A generation earlier
Schweitzer had sounded the death knell for naively doctrinaire biographies of
Jesus. But just as lives of the historical Jesus would again proliferate by the late
twentieth century, so would lives of the religious Freud, in spite of the fact that
Freud had tried several times to obstruct his future biographers by burning letters and docwnents.
If Schweitzer exposed the power of ideologies to generate misperceptions,
Freud exposed the power of unconscious wishes. Of the texts and authors examined here, Vitz, Sagan. and Scharfenberg fail to avoid ideologically and unconsciously motivated misperceptions in the reconstruction of their subject.
The Christian fundamentalist Vitz baptizes Freud. The feminist Sagan slays the
misogynist Freud and sculpts an egalitarian psychoanalysis. The Enlightenment
historian Gay denies the significance of Freud's Jewishness. While the theologian Scharfenberg constructs a productive dialogue between psychoanalysis
and theology, he reshapes Freud into an ersatz Christian. Only Kristeva avoids
a mythic reconstruction of her subject. She allows Freud to remain a godless
Jew, suggestively explores the moral and amorous vision he generated in his
creation of psychoanalysis, and acknowledges the paternal and "symbolic" as
well as "semiotic" shaping of aiTect in Western culture.
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Santa Clara University

506

•

ANNALS OF SCHOLARSHIP

Chodorow. Nancy. The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology
of Gender. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
Freud, Sigmund. The Future of an Illusion. Standard Edition 21. London: Hogarth,
1953-74.
---.Civilization and its Discontents. Standard Edition 21. London: Hogarth, 195374.
---.Totem and Taboo. Standard Edition 21. London: Hogarth, 1953-74.
Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.
Klein, Dennis. Jewish Origins of the Psychoanalytic Movement. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1985.
Kristeva, Julia. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Tr. Leon S. Roudiez. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1982.
- - - . "Stabat Mater," in The Kristeva Reader. Ed. Toril Moi. Tr. Leon S. Roudiez.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
---."Women's Time," in The Kristeva Reader. Ed. Toril Moi. Tr. Leon S. Roudiez.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- - - . Tales of Love. Tr. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press,
1987 ( 1983).
McGrath, William. Freud's Discovery of Psychoanalysis: The Politics of Hysteria. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.
---."Oedipus at Berggasse 19." Nel"-' York Review ofBooks, August 18, 1988.
Mitchell, Juliet. Psychoanalysis and Feminism. New York: Pantheon Books, 1974.
Schweitzer, Albert. The Quest for the 1/istoricallesus. Tr. W. Montgumery. London: A.
and C. Black, 1910 (1906).
Van Herik, Judith. Freud on Femininity and Faith. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1982.

